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Abstract 
The Rohingya have been de jure stateless since Myanmar’s 1974 Constitution and 1982 
Citizenship Act excluded them as a ‘national race,’ denying them citizenship and its contingent 
rights. Racial and religious persecution has intensified, producing intractable displacement 
and ‘in-placement’ (containment) of the Rohingya population. I examine why, despite the 
democratic transition ostensibly underway in Myanmar, access to any measure of justice seems 
ever less conceivable for the Rohingya. A discussion of the interplay between statelessness, 
refugeehood and citizenship guides an enquiry into the challenges for leveraging the 
transitional moment in Myanmar for Rohingyas to exercise their rights. Terms such as 
‘protection space’ and ‘humanitarian space’ are critiqued, so as to shift focus away from static 
notions of place and territoriality, and onto the dynamics of disenfranchisement and processes 
of exercising human rights. I conclude that barriers to accessing rights are exacerbated by the 
policies and institutional structures of international human rights actors, but that solutions are 
ultimately political and inter-personal, and hinge upon Myanmar’s navigation of its potential 
new role as an opening democracy, conditioned as it is by the exclusionary inclusion of the 
nation-state paradigm. 
 
Keywords: Myanmar, Rohingya, human rights, statelessness, citizenship, refugeehood, 
UNHCR, space. 
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Introduction 
 
The oft-cited remark that ‘the Rohingya are one of the most persecuted minorities in 
the world,’1 reifies this people as much as it invites examination of their multi-faceted 
persecution. I interrogate the dynamics contributing to the extreme difficulties faced when this 
group of around 1 million people living mostly in Myanmar’s Rakhine/Arakan state, and 
displaced into Bangladesh and beyond, seeks to exercise their human rights. The overarching 
concern framing my enquiry is the interaction between local and international concepts and 
actors, and how the latter, assumed arbiters of protection, may actually violate Rohingya rights. 
I examine practical and conceptual barriers to accessing rights, hoping that a combined 
approach will elucidate pathways for progress at this transitional moment in Myanmar. 
 
 The Rohingya – predominantly Muslims – have been severely persecuted since military 
rule began in 1962, and subjected to forced labour, arbitrary arrest, indefinite detention, torture, 
killings, sexual abuse, destruction of property and mosques, restricted freedom of movement, 
internal displacement, education bans, denial of medical treatment and family size limitations, 
amongst other atrocities. Discrimination and violence are perpetrated by officials, security 
forces and the Rakhine ethnic majority in Rakhine State, primarily Buddhists, with near total 
impunity. Although Rakhine are themselves another ethnic minority group, who claim 
independence from, and have waged armed insurgency against, the national majority Bamar 
(also Buddhist), Rakhine and Bamar are aligned over the Rohingya issue. Hate speech against 
Muslims, and the Rohingya in particular, is widely accepted, with monks and politicians 
leading boycotts against Muslim businesses, and inciting violence. 
 
This follows historical intolerance towards those many Burmese call ‘Bengali 
immigrants’ given their ethnic similarity to Bangladeshi Chittagonians. Tensions exist since 
the British colonialists’ encouragement of then-internal labour migration from the sub-
continent: the perceived monopoly newcomers held over administrative and economic power 
triggered anti-Indian riots, killing hundreds in the 1930s, and entrenching mistrust of non-
Buddhist minorities. The military intermittently mobilised these divisions subsequently, to 
divert attention from economic and security issues: ethnically-diverse Myanmar became ‘not 
so much a melting pot as a pressure cooker.’2 Discrimination was fostered legally: the 1982 
Citizenship Act denationalised Rohingya, denying their status as one of Myanmar’s 135 
recognised ‘national races.’ Only children of ‘national races’ were recognised as full citizens. 
Rohingyas’ resultant statelessness has exacerbated their poor access to protection domestically 
and abroad. 
 
Rohingya fled to Bangladesh in three major waves, of approximately 250,000 in 1978 
and 1991-92 each, and then in a more recent wave in 2012, though low-level displacement 
occurs regularly. Most Rohingya refugees are not recognised in Bangladesh, and are deemed 
illegal economic migrants and decried as Islamic terrorists. They have no local integration 
routes, live in an easily-exploited situation of precarious human security, and are detained or 
refouled occasionally. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) supplies basic aid to 30,470 
individuals registered in camps, and is blocked by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) from 
1 AFP, ‘Myanmar, Bangladesh leaders 'to discuss Rohingya’ (UNHCR, 2012) <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=4fe952205> accessed 15 August 2013. 
2 Michael W. Charney, A History of Modern Burma (CUP 2009) 18. 
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assisting an estimated 400,000 unregistered refugees.3 Approximately 635,000 Rohingya live 
as refugees or (generally irregular) migrants in Thailand, India, Malaysia, and further afield,4 
though refoulement has intensified regionally, with Thai authorities towing Rohingya boats out 
to sea and leaving hundreds to die,5 fearful of creating pull-factors to their territory. The 2012 
violence, which left 140,000 displaced internally,6 now effectively imprisoned in segregated 
camps, focussed international attention on what many commentators deem to be Myanmar’s 
nascent quasi-civilian democracy: Human Rights Watch reports signal state complicity in – 
and instigation of – violence, eliciting allegations of ‘outsourcing genocide.’7 Domestic 
impunity is mirrored by the international impunity the Government of Myanmar (GoM) enjoys, 
with other states and international institutions quick to praise reforms and compete as investors 
unencumbered by previous rights-centric, conditional approaches.8 
 
Whereas many other minority groups work alongside the opposition National League 
for Democracy, and are resolving their conflicts with the government, the Rohingya are 
shunned from these alliances. Rohingya resistance has been depicted as Islamist terrorism, as 
opposed to other ethnicities’ ‘freedom fighters.’ Aung San Suu Kyi’s human rights rhetoric 
does not extend to the Rohingya, given fears of alienating the Buddhist majority electorate now 
that meaningful political contestation is proving possible. Strong declarations – ‘trying to drive 
someone out of their own country is totally unacceptable’9 – have ceded to platitudes: ‘I will 
not take a stand.’10 Typically, analyses of Burmese minorities focus on recognised highlander 
groups: the Rohingyas’ unique situation of statelessness lies outside the centre-periphery 
paradigm, and is side-lined. Marginalisation by purported human rights activists suggests 
human rights are just demands against power, a signifier whose substance has not been 
internalised, and underscores the intractability of the Rohingya issue, despite changes on other 
fronts in Myanmar and the consequent resurgence of interest in its affairs. 
 
My analysis contemplates both those Rohingyas who remain stateless in Myanmar, and 
those who have fled as stateless refugees to Bangladesh and further. It is fuelled by unease with 
resignation towards this as a ‘protracted displacement’ deadlock, and humanitarian actors’ 
impotence in the face of sovereign power – particularly one party to few human rights 
3 Esther Kiragu, Angela Li Rosi and Tim Morris, ‘States of Denial: A review of UNHCR’s response to the 
protracted situation of stateless Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh’ (UNHCR Policy Development and 
Evaluation Service, 2011) <http://www.unhcr.org/4ee754c19.pdf> accessed 15 August 2013, 7. 
4 ibid. 
5 IRIN, ‘Thailand: Government, Army to investigate claims of Rohingya abuse’ (IRIN, 2009) 
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/82474/thailand-government-army-to-investigate-claims-of-rohingya-abuse> 
accessed 22 August 2013. 
6 IRIN, ‘Analysis: Keeping human rights on the agenda in Myanmar’ (IRIN, 2013) 
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/98178/myanmar-still-way-behind-on-human-rights> accessed 15 August 2013. 
7 Maung Zarni, ‘Genocidal Buddhists: An Interview with Burmese Dissident Maung Zarni’ (Tricycle, 2013) 
<http://www.tricycle.com/blog/genocidal-buddhists-interview-burmese-dissident-maung-zarni> accessed 15 
August 2013. 
8 Maung Zarni, ‘TIME's Cover Story on "Buddhist Terror" misses the point while raising the specter of further 
anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar’ (Maung Zarni, 2013a) <http://www.maungzarni.com/2013/06/times-cover-
story-on-buddhist-terror.html> accessed 15 August 2013. 
9 Aung San Suu Kyi, ‘Transcript of conversation with Aung San Suu Kyi, Congressman Richard, Mr Raheem 
(UNDP Resident Representative)’ (Refugee Studies Centre Archives, University of Oxford, unpublished c.1993) 
25. 
10 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Myanmar: Storm Clouds on the Horizon,’ Asia Report No. 238 (ICG, 
2012), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar/238-myanmar-storm-
clouds-on-the-horizon> accessed 16 August 2013. 
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instruments.11 Lack of citizenship is a lesser-understood phenomenon, and this case highlights 
the interconnectedness of statelessness, vulnerability, persecution and displacement. I am 
compelled by the idea that while Rohingyas pierce the fiction of historical unity in Myanmar,12 
the plight of exiled Rohingya carries wider significance, for ‘by breaking up the identity 
between man and citizen, between nativity and nationality, the refugee throws into crisis the 
original fiction of sovereignty.’13 Stateless refugees thus represent that most unknowable of 
‘Others,’ simultaneously explaining their comprehensive rejection at all doors and, conversely, 
‘clear[ing] the field for a no-longer-delayable renewal of categories’14 – the spark for creative 
thinking and fresh advocacy is ushered in. 
 
I situate my analysis in light of Marc Galanter’s reflections on the expanding domain 
of ‘access to justice’ efforts and theorising, given increased human capabilities and consequent 
widening perceptions of what constitutes injustice to be redressed.15 My community 
rapprochement discussion vindicates Galanter’s original argument that ‘access to justice is not 
just a matter of bringing cases to a font of official justice, but of enhancing the justice quality 
of the relations and transactions in which people are engaged,’16 setting a wide stage for 
innovative conceptualisations of the now-institutionalised movement. I eschew rigid silos of 
first, second and third wave of access to justice – ‘Western’ chronology ill-fits the Burmese 
context, catapulting into globalised modernity – and highlight daily access to rights, 
independent of legal institutions, as a precondition for accessing any measure of just treatment. 
If states primarily protect and guarantee rights, belonging to a state – through citizenship – 
equates to the ‘right to have rights.’17 Access to citizenship, therefore, is key to accessing rights 
and justice (however conceptualised), though it cannot open all doors alone. My observation is 
not far extrapolated from mainstream access to justice theorising, epitomised in Mauro 
Cappelletti’s 1981 study, which characterises class actions for diffuse interest groups 
(encompassing minority rights) as a key feature of the ‘second wave’ in the evolution of the 
access to justice movement. 
 
I begin by framing the debate, picking apart fluid, obfuscatory terms like nationality, 
state, citizen, race and ethnicity. This informs discussion of the legal peculiarities behind 
statelessness, compared to refugeehood, and the pressing responsibility question. I pick apart 
the most commonly proffered solution to the Rohingya problem (eventual acquisition of 
citizenship), arguing that this quick-fix ignores myriad other barriers preventing Rohingya 
from accessing their rights, at ‘home’ and abroad. I then dwell on the inconsistencies of the 
UNHCR-administered protection, and UNHCR’s role as a surrogate state, all the while 
acknowledging the Agency’s difficult position. To stimulate fresh thinking, I highlight the 
negatives of uncritically-deployed buzzwords like ‘protection space,’ and suggest a less 
11 Myanmar is only party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the 1948 
Genocide Treaty, but does not recognise complaint mechanisms of the latter two. 
12 Maung Zarni, ‘An Inside View of Reconciliation,’ in Lex Rieffel (ed.), Myanmar/Burma: Inside Challenges, 
Outside Interests (The Brookings Institution and Konrad Adenauer Foundation 2010) 67. 
13 Giorgio Agamben, ‘We Refugees’ (1995) 49(2) Symposium 114, 117. 
14 ibid. 
15 Marc Galanter, ‘Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability’ (2009) 37(1) Fordham Urban 
Law Journal, 115. 
16 Marc Galanter, ‘Justice in Many Rooms,’ in Mauro Cappelletti (ed.), Access to Justice and the Welfare State, 
(European University Institute 1981) 147 – 182, 161. 
17 Hannah Arendt, ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man,’ in Hannah Arendt (ed.), 
The Origins of Totalitarianism (The World Publishing Company 1951, Second enlarged edition 1958), 267 – 
302, 296. 
6 
 
                                                          
‘spatialised’ use of rights discourses. Finally, I assess what potential exists for Rohingya to 
exercise their rights, through interpersonal and community relations of tolerance (as opposed 
to explicit rights claims), and through aspects of a potential democratic transition the state could 
leverage – whilst questioning the assumption that Myanmar is in fact moving towards greater 
democracy. 
 
 
1. Contextualising, conceptualising 
 
Framing the debate 
 
The major human rights treaties and legal frameworks covering displacement and 
statelessness – the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol 
(Refugee Convention); the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (Statelessness Conventions) – are 
geographically biased, given their drafting early in the post-colonial moment. Unravelling 
Burmese issues through this Eurocentric lens risks misfiring. Myanmar’s regions – more 
accurately, nations (social, co-ethnic groups) – were named ‘ethnic states,’ by British colonists 
and administered as ‘Scheduled Areas’ rather than ‘Burma Proper,’ fostering division; claims 
to independence from liberated Burma; armed insurgencies, and parallel post-colonial 
governance structures. The intractability of these divisions is disproportionate to their arbitrary 
genesis, and many deem the resultant fault-lines between the Bamar and other groups a greater 
obstacle to peace than military authoritarianism.18 These ethnically-delineated constituencies 
institutionalised a politics based on European concepts of race and ethnicity, essentialising 
peoples and reifying their historic relations to render them legible to colonists. This myth of 
ethnicity as a ‘basic and ineluctable’19 category characterised ethnic conflict as inevitable.  
 
The sovereign nation-state paradigm is generally considered an immutable concept 
underpinning international law and relations, though ‘growing portions of humanity can no 
longer be represented within it.’20 ‘Nation’ in mid-twentieth-century Europe was coterminous 
with ‘state,’ given European populations’ relative homogeneity. In ethnically-diverse 
territories like Myanmar, nations without statehood abound. Nonetheless, many international 
instruments (the Refugee and Statelessness Conventions, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR]) use nationality 
interchangeably with citizenship, though citizenship more precisely denotes formal 
membership status in a politically-shaped legal entity (the state), and the processes this 
involves. It will be understood as such herein, alongside my above conceptualisation of 
citizenship as a distinct aspect of access to justice. Similarly, the ‘national’ is used to denote 
aspects particular to a state, in contradistinction to the ‘international,’ further conflating nation 
and state. Nationality is polysemic and politicised in Myanmar, referring both to membership 
in co-ethnic groups, or to belonging within the state. International blurring of nationality and 
citizenship reinforces caveats surrounding external interpretation of Myanmar: declaring 
‘nationality remains the principal international legal status by which access to a state's territory 
18 Alan Saw U, ‘Reflections on Confidence-building and Cooperation among Ethnic Groups in Myanmar: A 
Karen Case Study,’ in N. Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (eds.), Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity (Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies and Hiroshima Peace Institute 2007), 219 – 235. 
19 Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in Southeast Asia (CUP 2010) 33. 
20 Agamben (n 13) 117. 
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is achieved,’21 obscures more than it enlightens. Although nationality can carry legal qualities, 
I use it to signify social or ethnic belonging. 
 
The military’s popularisation of the term ‘national race’ for ‘ethnic minority’ is a state-
building strategy, linguistically whitewashing the actual marginalisation of non-Bamar groups. 
Aligning nationality with race further muddies the water. Again present as a static concept in 
refugee law and other international legal instruments, including the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ‘race’ is highly contested in Myanmar. The 
government’s total of 135 ‘races’ recognised by the Citizenship Act is at odds with 
international understandings of race (although an equally constructed categorisation, 
‘ethnicities’ is more applicable, denoting shared language and culture rather than phenotype), 
and derives from a colonial-era linguistic diversity survey.22 That race confers citizenship is 
the controversy at the crux of the Rohingyas’ persecution. Race and religion are then conflated: 
Muslims’ ID cards read ‘Indian’ or ‘Bengali’ under ‘religion,’ rendering them foreign and 
cementing Buddhism’s centrality. Consequently, other recognised Muslim minorities with full 
citizenship are discriminated against: 12,000 Kaman Muslims in central Myanmar also remain 
displaced following attacks during 2012 anti-Rohingya violence. Terminology is highly 
volatile – even Myanmar/Burma deploys loaded connotations that undermine reconciliatory 
aims. 
 
 Categorisation as stateless or refugees (or both) also mobilises connotations, and affects 
rights and identities. Predicated on the inability to return to a polity where one belonged, 
refugeehood and statelessness were identical in the World War II mass denationalisation and 
expulsion that engendered the international refugee regime and revealed the chasm between 
man, in spurious possession of human rights, and citizen, whose rights were anchored 
positively in legislation or constitutions. Today, refugeehood hinges on persecution and 
crossing a border; stateless individuals need not be displaced, and may simply result from 
administrative anomalies. Although not necessarily persecuted, their legal vulnerability is 
easily exploited. From an Arendtian perspective, the ‘calamity’ of stateless persons is ‘not that 
they are oppressed but that nobody wants even to oppress them.’23 Guy Goodwin-Gill argues 
that a lack of interest in statelessness globally partly stems from situations where it is but an 
unfashionable legal-technical problem, causing ‘few …[to] ever look… to the underlying 
human rights issues.’24 
 
Rohingya abroad are both stateless and refugees, however ‘the refugee’ cuts a more 
political figure. The stateless are discriminated against for who they are – refugeehood 
encompasses this, but can also include those persecuted for their actions and beliefs. 
Consequently statelessness connotes no political activity per se, and can be aligned with a lack 
of agency, fostering disempowering narratives around stateless people (and compounding the 
denial of persecution in Bangladesh’s classifying Rohingya arrivals as economic migrants). 
The linkages, however, are clear: lack of any state’s protection creates a particular vulnerability 
to abuse, often triggering refugee flows. Defining as stateless risks diluting claims to 
repatriation and the responsibility of the state in which membership is claimed, problematic 
especially when this is a persecutor state whose accountability is sought. Conversely, ‘refugee’ 
connotes political resistance, exile networks, diaspora cultures – a general identity of pride.  
21 Alison Kesby, The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law (OUP 2012) 21. 
22 David I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar (Georgetown University Press 2001) 182. 
23 Arendt (n 17) 295 – 296. 
24 Guy Goodwin-Gill, ‘The rights of refugees and stateless persons,’ in K. P. Saksena (ed.) Human Rights 
Perspective and Challenges (In 1990 and Beyond) (Lancers Books 1994) 378 – 401. 
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Regarding rights, unlike refugee status, statelessness does not always confer exemption 
from unlawful entry penalties: the stateless could then be exempt from the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (ICCPR) provision for liberty of movement, extended 
only to ‘everyone lawfully within the territory of a State’ (Article 12). This Covenant depends 
on presumptions of legal personality – precisely what statelessness denies.25 The Rohingyas’ 
invisibility, outside outbursts of widespread violence, has characterised their struggle: when 
not hidden from humanitarian actors denied access to Rohingya areas, the military’s 
withholding of food and livelihoods induced permanent low-level movement into Bangladesh 
– relatively unremarkable, and attributable to economic motivations according to restrictive 
official classifications. ‘Illegible’ refugees were subsumed into the ‘economic migrant’ label, 
excising them from UNHCR’s protection. UNHCR officials themselves utilised this label in 
Bangladesh, legitimising unequal protection hierarchies.26 That most Rohingya-hosting states 
are not party to the Refugee Convention normalises lower protection standards, creating a 
regional gap, which I consider in Chapter 2.  
 
 Though, unlike refugee law, the Statelessness Conventions do not privilege border-
crossing (a dubious needs indicator, ignoring internally encamped Rohingya, or non-Rohingya 
residents, equally violence-affected), their protections are still suboptimal. Whilst the 1961 
Convention contains positive obligations for states to confer nationality in some situations (see 
Articles 1, 4), and circumscribes denationalisation, its sparse ratification (53 signatories) 
prevents these progressive norms from gaining traction. Article 32 of the 1954 Convention 
encourages States to ‘as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of stateless 
persons’ – a restrained exhortation compelling scant action. It excludes de facto stateless 
persons possessing a formal, but not operational or protective nationality, ‘as a counterbalance 
to the fact that otherwise, statelessness can afford the individual greater protection than his or 
her own strictly legal status,’27 eliciting ‘flood-gate’ fears, even though ending legal ties 
between state and citizen can be a more humane action. Kelly Staples suggests that drafters 
cared mostly about affording non-citizen residents a status that allowed host states to treat them 
as foreign: ‘whether or not this identity conferred assistance or protection was a secondary 
question,’28 recalling the fragility of rights – not innate, but agreed upon by the powerful. This 
further justifies an expanded access to justice perspective, beyond bringing law to the 
disenfranchised: addressing restrictive formulations of rights rather than accepting existing 
constructions of ‘justice.’ 
 
 Whose problem? 
 
 Although ‘beneficiaries’ are out of fashion, and ‘rights-holders’ du jour, corresponding 
duty-bearers are less identifiable. If no state accepts responsibility for a group, it is 
controversial that they should become the responsibility of the international community or its 
institutions. It may be unrealistic to expect a government which renders people stateless and 
permits persecution to step in and offer some level of protection: Myanmar’s president and the 
2014 draft of the ‘Rakhine Action Plan’ both advocate segregation and encampment of 
25 Kelly Staples, Retheorising Statelessness: A Background Theory of Membership in World Politics (Edinburgh 
University Press 2012) 
26 United States Committee for Refugees (USCR), U.S. Committee for Refugees Site Visit to Bangladesh, June 
20 – July 1, 1996 (USCR 1996) 7. 
27 Staples (n 25) 20. 
28 ibid. 
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Rohingya pending their mass resettlement,29 a policy resembling ethnic cleansing. UN and 
international non-governmental organisations’ (INGO) reports detail authorities’ failure to 
protect Muslims even with intelligence on planned attacks.30 Rather than punishing the border 
forces, the GoM’s Inquiry Commission on the Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State 
recommended increasing troops ‘equipped with weapons for conflict resolution;’ ‘assault 
boats’ for the Navy, and prolonged segregation of Rohingya internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) in containment camps rather than return to their homes.31 It further proposed 
implementing the provisions of the current citizenship law, likely to be manipulated to their 
exclusion, judging by preliminary results of a now stalled ‘citizenship verification’ process in 
2014.32 
 
Nonetheless, shunting such populations into the domain of bureaucratic, opaque UN 
Agencies raises accountability questions, and illustrates how Rohingya fall through 
international protection safety nets: after 35 years hosting, there remains ‘no clarity on who is 
responsible for ensuring that the basic needs of unregistered refugees are met’ in Bangladesh.33 
Although mandated to protect stateless persons since 1974, when the 1961 Statelessness 
Convention came into force, staffing and budget constraints impede UNHCR’s effective 
execution of these duties. The estimated 12 million stateless people worldwide34 therefore 
inhabit the continuum between an aspirational institutional mandate, and that same institution’s 
endeavours to promote government ownership of protection.  
 
Despite UNHCR’s interest in statelessness, and recent campaigns to boost this, 
operational realities hamper the protection of stateless people’s rights. UNHCR assumes de 
facto sovereignty when running a camp – were it a state actor, its effective jurisdiction would 
trigger duties on its part. International legal personality should anchor the Agency’s governance 
in human rights law, however ‘the obligatory side of personality is almost completely 
ignored,’35 with emphasis on what UNHCR is entitled to do. UNHCR’s presence in Bangladesh 
derives its legal basis from a 1993 repatriation-focussed Memorandum of Understanding, 
impeding it from addressing rights violations inflicted on Rohingya refugees by host 
communities or GoB officials. The indeterminate legal status of its other activities thus leaves 
them at the mercy of the organisation’s diplomatic relations with the GoB, which deteriorated 
to the point of forced closure of income-generating activities and skills-training in 2010. 
Accusations of UNHCR ‘stepping out of its mandate and getting involved in development 
29 IRIN, ‘Briefing: Myanmar’s Rohingya crisis’ (IRIN, 2012) <http://www.irinnews.org/report/96801/briefing-
myanmar-s-rohingya-crisis> accessed 19 August 2013. 
30 Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), ‘Joint Open Letter on review of the 
European Union’s joint decision on Burma’ (FIDH, 2013) <http://www.fidh.org/IMG/article_PDF/Joint-Open-
Letter-on-review-of-the-European-Union-s-joint-decision-on_a13139.pdf> accessed 19 August 2013. 
31 Inquiry Commission on the Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State, ‘Executive Summary of the Final Report’ 
(Burma Partnership, 2013) <http://www.burmapartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Executive-
SummaryEnglish-Version.pdf> accessed 21 August 2013, 2. 
32 Sarnata Reynolds and Jeff Crisp, ‘Myanmar: A tipping point for Rohingya rights?’ (Refugees International, 
2014) 
<http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/111714_myanmar_a_tipping_point_for_rohingya_rights_
letterhead_0.pdf> accessed 23 March 2015. 
33 Refugees International (RI), ‘Rohingya in Bangladesh: Maintaining the Status Quo; Squandering a Rare 
Opportunity’ (RI, 2012a) 
<http://www.refintl.org/sites/default/files/103012_Rohingya_In_Bangladesh%20letterhead.pdf> accessed 19 
August 2013, 1. 
34 UNHCR, ‘Millions are Stateless, Living in Legal Limbo’ (UNHCR, 2011) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/4e54ec469.html> accessed 20 August 2013, 1. 
35 Guglielmo Verdirame, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians? (CUP 2011) 73. 
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initiatives,’36 illustrate the fragility of international protection mandates in the face of state 
sovereignty, and the sensitivities surrounding ceding some responsibility for populations 
present on a state’s territory. That criticism is directed at UNHCR demonstrates the extent to 
which ‘UNHCR, rather than states, becomes seen as being responsible for rights,’37 acquiring 
comparable power and creating similar accountability black-holes. Mandates aside, protection 
offered by UN Agencies cannot be comparable to that of a state, because ‘liberty and human 
rights do not exist in a political vacuum; the state provides a political space which no 
international organisation has been able to match.’38 States permit agency, which is central to 
protection; Agencies inhibit it. 
 
Additionally, there are concerns about diluting UNHCR’s mandate. Expanded formally 
in 1998 to cover IDPs, doubts resurface intermittently regarding capacity. The UN Country 
Team in Myanmar is presently overstretched, with humanitarian and development activities 
attributed to the same actors.39 In Myanmar, UNHCR maintains camps hosting thousands of 
internally displaced Rohingya following the 2012 violence. As Barbara Harrell-Bond and 
Guglielmo Verdirame conclusively documented in 2005, despite being born of a Convention 
establishing refugee rights, UNHCR bows to budget constraints and realpolitik to the detriment 
of rights protection. Indeed statelessness is amongst the most sensitive topics for UNHCR to 
engage governments on, for it relates directly to identity and sovereignty issues. In the semi-
authoritarian Burmese context, and in the impasse with the GoB, humanitarian actors trade 
access for silence. How this service-provider role constrains outspokenness on human rights is 
epitomised by the resigned ‘harm minimization strategy’ followed in Bangladeshi camps.40 
Long-term, this has instigated dependency, making effective protection delivery harder. 
Similarly, UN-maintained IDP camps in Myanmar, subject to increasingly long-term pledges 
of support, effectively ‘[enable] the government of Myanmar to pursue a strategy which is 
based on systematic discrimination and the violation of human rights… [suggesting] the 
humanitarian and human rights imperatives of the United Nations are not always easy to 
reconcile.’41 Indeed rights violations are inherent to encampment, especially in protracted 
settings, whether in IDP or refugee contexts: restricting movement undermines a host of rights 
concerning livelihoods, health and education, which I unpack shortly with particular reference 
to refugee situations. 
 
The UN endorses Myanmar’s ‘communal violence’ narrative, circumventing the extent 
of state involvement.42 Artificial separation of the ‘humanitarian’ – or the ‘legal’ – from the 
36 Kiragu et al. (n 3) 12. 
37 Sarah Deardoff, ‘How long is too long? Questioning the legality of long-term encampment through a human 
rights lens,’ Working Paper Series No. 54 (Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2009) 
<http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/working-papers-folder_contents/RSCworkingpaper54.pdf> accessed 23 
August 2013, 32. 
38 Verdirame (n 35) 395. 
39 Refugees International (RI), ‘Myanmar: Protecting Minority Rights is Non-Negotiable,’ Field Report (RI, 
2013) <http://www.refintl.org/sites/default/files/053013_Myanmar_Preotecting_Minority%20letterhead.pdf> 
accessed 18 August 2013, 2. 
40 Eileen Pittaway, ‘The Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: A Failure of the International Protection Regime,’ 
in Howard Adelman (ed.), Protracted Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home (Ashgate 2008), 83 – 104, 
99.  
41 Jeff Crisp, ‘Get Up, Stand Up: How Serious Is the UN’s New Human Rights Initiative?’ (RI, 2014) 
<http://refugeesinternational.org/blog/get-stand-how-serious-un%E2%80%99s-new-human-rights-initiative> 
accessed 23 March 2015. 
42 UNHCHR, ‘Religious violence in Myanmar, the consequences of Government inaction in tackling prejudice 
and discrimination – UN expert’ (OHCHR, 2013) 
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‘political’ contradicts UNHCR’s own guidance: former High Commissioner Sadako Ogata 
stressed ‘there are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems.’43 That UNHCR’s 
Executive Committee is comprised of states which frequently violate refugee rights (including 
Bangladesh) further undermines its purported neutrality, exacerbating accusations that 
answerability is to donor states rather than refugees. Statelessness can only be resolved through 
sovereign action: any push for this by humanitarians is necessarily political. Glossing over 
political involvement and de facto responsibility for human lives is bad faith. David Kennedy 
highlights reluctance to embrace ‘responsible rulership’ as a key hindrance to the international 
human rights regime. However, if ‘activists… embrace the exercise of power and… develop 
an enhanced appetite for political conflict, and for the responsible exercise of human 
freedom,’44 this again relegates state responsibility, extracting the creators of statelessness from 
its resolution. 
 
 
 
2. Problems 
 
Citizenship: a panacea? 
 
Full Burmese citizenship is the most widely advocated solution for Rohingyas’ 
problems, exalted as the right to have rights; the key to accessing just treatment, and at least 
negative peace.45 Article 3 of the Citizenship Act limits indigeneity temporally, declaring 
‘Nationals such as the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Rakhine or Shan and ethnic 
groups as have settled in any of the territories included within the State as their permanent 
home from a period anterior to 1185 B.E., 1823 A.D. are Burma citizens.’ Few Rohingya can 
document their ancestors’ residence in territories that later became Myanmar this far back 
(British rule began in 1824, though Muslims in present-day Rakhine State pre-date this); 
decades of arson, confiscation of papers and displacement have decimated evidence, rendering 
many claims ineligible. ‘Naturalised’ citizenship, under Article 42 of the Act was ostensibly 
offered to Rohingya under a ‘citizenship verification’ exercise initiated in 2014 and now 
stalled, however this rested on a disavowal of Rohingya identity: only the few who agreed to 
identify as ‘Bengali’ were admitted to the verification process.46 This category of citizenship 
is essentially inferior, and equally inaccessible. It requires ‘conclusive evidence’ that an 
applicant has ‘entered and resided in the State anterior to 4th January, 1948, and their offsprings 
[were] born within the State,’ again difficult for Rohingya to establish before restrictive 
governmental interpretation and evidentiary standards.47 Status is withheld if the applicant is 
judged not to ‘be of good character [or]… sound mind,’ under Articles 44(d) and (e), and can 
be rescinded under Article 58(d) and (f) for ‘showing disaffection or disloyalty to the State… 
[or] committing an offence involving moral turpitude.’  
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13205&LangID=E> accessed 19 
August 2013. 
43 UNHCR, ‘Ogata calls for stronger political will to solve refugee crises’ (UNHCR, 2005) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/4297406a2.html> accessed 19 August 2013. 
44 David Kennedy, ‘The international human rights regime: still part of the problem?’ in Rob Dickinson, Elena 
Katselli, Colin Murray and Ole W. Pederson (eds.), Examining Critical Perspectives on Human Rights (CUP 
2012), 19 – 34, 32 – 33. 
45 Refugees International (n 39); UNHCR, ‘Refugee Consultations: Bangladesh’ (Refworld, 2007a) 
<http://www.refworld.org/topic,50ffbce510,50ffbce52b,46f0ec002,0,,RESEARCH,BGD.html> accessed 10 
September 2013. 
46 Reynolds and Crisp (n 32).  
47 Refugees International (n 39) 5. 
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Granting citizenship does not mean all other rights follow, for conceptual and practical 
reasons. As Hannah Arendt explored, rights cannot be anchored in bare humanity (evidenced 
in Nazi Germany), but rather demonstrate the necessity of membership in a political sphere 
that can protect them.48 Assertions of rights, without a guarantor, were effectively worthless: 
rights became government-dependent. The state, however, when aligned with the nation, posed 
a threat to humanity: the production of subordinate, racialised ‘minorities,’ again reveals cracks 
in membership’s protections. This process is legal, social and cultural – and not easily 
deactivated: all-encompassing ‘discursive and material practices create the Other, and then take 
the ascribed Otherness as a justification for… differential treatment.’49 Arendt’s solutions, 
while recognising the nation-state’s potentially repressive omnipotence, remain citizenship-
centric, indicating her persistent trust in law, the state and its derivatives. Perhaps given her 
stature and personal experience of persecution, statelessness and exile, this focus on citizenship 
remains relatively unquestioned in mainstream discourse. It is a practical option in many 
situations, however critical examination of the institution of citizenship is vital. Citizenship’s 
protections and enhanced entitlements (compared to non-citizens) are not uniform.  Its internal 
barriers augment the overarching exclusionary logic producing citizens and non-citizens. This 
is explicit in Myanmar’s tiered citizenship laws, but is often de facto: poverty, internal 
displacement and discrimination are common barriers to exercising citizenship-derived rights, 
from voting to socio-economic rights. Formal citizenship often proves insufficient to guarantee 
the latter in particular: substantive citizenship is thus required. 
 
Citizenship’s internal barriers highlight the importance of recognition in society, 
beyond governmental bestowal of papers – though institutions are necessary for safeguarding 
rights. ‘Political understandings of rights regimes’50 are paramount, as laws are enmeshed 
within the societies shaping and interpreting them.  Community recognition and inclusion 
enable participation in governance and countenance intolerance at the grassroots level. The 
long history of the nation-state, or ethnicity/nation as a structuring principle, is hard to 
transcend. ‘Dislodging citizenship from the confines of the national [and]… decentring the 
national frame of reference from its privileged position in citizenship theory’51 remains a 
challenge globally, and a chimera in what has been deemed ‘transitional’ Myanmar. Now 
power is being diversified, pluralisation of citizenship receives even greater suspicion than that 
entrenched by decades-long one-party rule. Nation and law remain conflated, though the 
nation-state does not match reality. Transcending these limitations at all levels is vital, for 
rights rest on being socially embedded in a community. However, GoM officials admit that 
‘even after being given citizenship and resettlement… a Bengali [sic] with a citizenship card 
still won't be able to walk into a Rakhine village.’52 
 
As the modern construct upon which exercising human rights demonstrably hinges, 
citizenship is part of the problem and the solution: ‘the law divides inside from outside and is 
then asked to heal the scar or bandage it by offering limited protection to its own creations.’53 
Conventions may declare a right to nationality, but this depends on acts of state sovereignty. 
48 Arendt (n 17). 
49 Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the politics of 
belonging (Palgrave 2000) 82. 
50 Staples (n 25) 136. 
51 Dora Kostakopoulou, The Future Governance of Citizenship (CUP 2008) 10. 
52 Reuters, ‘Rohingya could face detention under Myanmar draft plan’ (Reuters, 2014) 
 <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/27/uk-myanmar-rohingya-idUKKCN0HM09B20140927> accessed 23 
March 2015. 
53 Costas Douzinas, The end of human rights (Hart Publishing 2000)  358. 
13 
 
                                                          
Denationalisation, or production of statelessness, Staples argues, is ‘unlawful under 
international human rights law,’ yet simultaneously valid, as states retain the sovereign right to 
determine citizenship criteria.54 Exclusion is the corollary of inclusion, and laws institutionalise 
this insider/outsider division. Invoking citizenship to counteract political exclusion dilutes 
claims to rights as attached to humanity; invoking humanity ‘subsumes the citizen such that 
the agency of the political status of citizenship is reduced to the passive condition of being a 
rights-bearer.’55 In sum, citizenship’s protection needs comprehensive recognition at all levels; 
purely legalistic belonging still permits the suffering of egregious rights violations. 
  
Further barriers 
 
Whilst prospects for Rohingya within Myanmar to exercise their human rights remain 
slim, and dependent on the GoM’s acts and reconciliation amongst inhabitants, further barriers 
to accessing rights exist which are particular to the situation of those living abroad as refugees, 
confirming citizenship’s limitations. Recourse to international protection is no panacea either: 
it does not guarantee an acceptable range of rights, and substandard international protection 
can be synonymous with grave violations itself, an issue to be highlighted given persistent trust 
in international organisations as rights-protectors. I concur that ‘any authority, however 
constituted, has the potential to violate the rights and liberties of the individual,’56 and should 
be scrutinised. 
 
Refoulement 
 
Statelessness can impede recognition as a refugee, meaning that Rohingya outside 
Myanmar may be at greater risk of refoulement, the prohibition of which is the cornerstone of 
international refugee law. Its status as customary international law, an offshoot of the universal 
prohibition on torture, is amongst the less frequently violated protections conferred on 
refugees, as it theoretically binds even countries not party to the Refugee Convention, like 
Bangladesh and Thailand. However, the treatment of Rohingya by Bangladeshi and other Asian 
states reveals erosion at this powerful norm’s margins. Whilst clear instances of refoulement 
have previously occurred from Bangladesh (200,000 Rohingya were returned in 1992-94, 
initially with UNHCR assistance though UNHCR withdrew when involuntariness became 
patent), it is this poorly concealed refoulement I seek to interrogate. Closing borders to refugees 
– as Bangladesh did in 2012, 2008 and previously – equates to refoulement, and engages the 
destination state’s responsibility. Boat push-backs have caused loss of life, however the Thai 
government’s evasion of responsibility is unsound: it alleges that refoulement has not occurred, 
because its ‘help on’ policy entails ‘donating’ (inadequate) sustenance and fuel, on the 
understanding that boats continue onward to Indonesia or Malaysia57 – perversely, this is 
posited as assisting Rohingyas.  The practical impossibilities of displaced Rohingya ever 
pursuing remedies for these serious violations – without ever reaching Bangladeshi or Thai 
territory – illustrate the fragility of access to international protection.  
 
Despite scrutiny following the 1990s ‘repatriations,’ debates around voluntariness of 
return to Myanmar persist. Repatriation is more than physical return: it connotes the restoration 
54 Staples (n 25) 19. 
55 Kesby (n 21) 144. 
56 Verdirame (n 35) 298. 
57 Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Thailand: Release and Protect Rohingya “Boat People”’ (HRW, 2013a) 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/20/thailand-release-and-protect-rohingya-boat-people> accessed 22 August 
2013. 
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of ruptured bonds with a state, and returnees’ full inclusion. Significantly, governments and 
UNHCR are bound by different thresholds for return. States not party to the Refugee 
Convention are only required not to refoule refugees (send them to where their lives or freedom 
would be threatened), but UNHCR’s Statute only permits it to promote and facilitate voluntary 
repatriation. UNHCR can therefore assist refugees who freely choose return, without 
ascertaining safety conditions in the country of origin. Admirably, emphasis is on refugees’ 
agency and consent. However, UNHCR is thus incentivised to downplay accusations of 
coercion, and back arguably cosmetic procedures to demonstrate refugees’ volition. A profiling 
survey recently aborted in Thailand, angered (non-Rohingya) Burmese refugees, for it ‘solicits 
answers that favour repatriation [and which]… signatories fear… could be used as an indication 
of “voluntary return.”’58 This suggests an institutional propensity to encourage return (without 
repatriation, or restoration of bonds) despite refugees’ vocal opposition – Agency-driven rather 
than rights- or needs-based. Although violence has subsided in Rakhine, returning Rohingya 
to a situation where the citizenship impasse institutionalises persecution, amounts to cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment (a degree ‘below’ torture), incurring the refoulement 
prohibition. 
 
Containment 
 
Before addressing whether down-scaling of UNHCR-administered services in camps 
amounts to forcing return (and at what point), I make the case against encampment, which 
inescapably violates forced migrants’ human rights; swaps displacement with in-placement, 
and is the backdrop against which additional privations are experienced. It is pertinent to note 
that there are no references to camps in the entire Refugee Convention, stemming as it does 
from the horrors of the Second World War in Europe.59 The restricted freedom of movement 
inherent to camp settings is a human rights violation, triggering and institutionalising violations 
of other rights. Nonetheless, countries such as Bangladesh, which are not party to the Refugee 
Convention, whose article 26 protects freedom of movement, argue that conditions on the 
ICCPR’s freedom of movement protections (in Article 12) – namely, lawful entry – apply, for 
they are not obliged to regard irregular entrance for asylum-seeking as lawful.  
 
In addition to the evident curb on the right to freedom of movement (enshrined as well 
in Article 13 of the UDHR, which is generally – though not always – accepted as customary 
international law, and is frequently cited by Bangladesh’s Supreme Court),60 the absence of 
adequate services in camps, and the barrier on accessing local services outside them, mean that 
the rights to education, health, property and in many instances the right to a family life are 
frequently inaccessible.61 The right to employment or to earn a livelihood is enshrined in 
58 Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), ‘Fearing repatriation, Mae La refugees shun profiling survey’ (DVB, 
2013) <http://www.dvb.no/news/fearing-repatriation-mae-la-refugees-shun-profiling-survey/28656> accessed 
22 August 2013. 
59 Merrill Smith, ‘Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a Waste of Humanity’ (US Committee for 
Refugees and Immigrants, 2004) 
<http://www.uscrirefugees.org/2010Website/5_Resources/5_5_Refugee_Warehousing/5_5_3_Translations/War
ehousing_Refugees_A_Denial_of_Rights.pdf> accessed 22 March 2015. 
60 Mostafa Hosain, ‘Application of UDHR by Supreme Court of Bangladesh: Analysis of Judgments’ (Chancery 
Law Chronicles, 2013) <http://www.clcbd.org/journal/13.html> accessed 22 March 2015. 
61 The universal right to education is provided by the UDHR’s Article 26, and in Article 13 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to which Bangladesh is party since 1998. The 
right to health is protected by Article 12 of the ICESCR and Article 25 of the UDHR. The right to property is 
found in Article 17 of the UDHR Article 17, and is explicit in the Refugee Convention’s Article 13, although 
this does not currently apply in Bangladesh. Articles 17 and 23 of the ICCPR, ratified by Bangladesh in 2000, 
guarantee the right to a family life, as do Articles 12 and 16 of the UDHR. 
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Article 23 of the UDHR and in Articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both of which are applicable in Bangladesh, and in 
Articles 17 and 18 of the Refugee Convention. In signatory states, is protected in protracted 
displacement settings in particular by the Refugee Convention’s requirement in Article 17(2)(a) 
that states grant refugees the same treatment as nationals regarding employment if they have 
spent three years in the first country of asylum. However, work rights are effectively retracted 
in camps, as residents are cut off from raw materials, markets and skills training. This 
undermines the self-sufficiency drives UNHCR promotes, impacting also the right to food 
(found in the ICESCR’s Article 11, and the UDHR’s Article 25), and is aggravated by the 
explicit prohibition on post-primary education in Bangladeshi camps, obliterating generations 
of refugees’ self-empowerment potential. Tensions caused by encampment and enforced 
dependency generate high levels of violence, including rape and sexual and gender-based 
violence, as has been noted in camp settings globally, including in Rohingya camps in 
Bangladesh.62 Often unable to file a complaint or go to court, due to movement restrictions or 
prohibitive transport costs from isolated locations, victims’ right to due process and to 
recognition before the law (provided for in Articles 14 and 16 of the ICCPR and in Articles 6 
and 7 of the UDHR) is also curtailed. Rape and sexual abuse constitute violations of the 
fundamental right to freedom from ‘torture or… cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ 
provided by Article 5 of the UDHR and Article 7 of the ICCPR, as well as violations of victims’ 
right to dignity (found in the UDHR’s Articles 1 and 22, and recognised in the preambles of 
the ICESCR and ICCPR as an inherent quality from which all other rights derive). It is also 
argued that this can stem simply from a lack of ‘the freedom to engage in productive work – 
…an important part of human dignity.’63 
 
Indeed the Refugee Convention’s protection is selective, excluding ‘all mention of civil 
and political rights once a person has attained refugee status,’64 circumscribing entitlements 
beyond those of human rights regimes, and obfuscating the wrongfulness of camps. That 
Sphere Project results (minimum humanitarian standards) resemble legal regulations of 
prisoners of war camps,65 signals the permeation of mistrust and securitisation in approaching 
refugees. Camps encapsulate Agamben’s ‘space of exception’ outside mainstream regulation 
by law, where individuals are divorced from political management of their own situation and 
thereby dehumanised, leaving ‘bare life’ to be institutionalised and governed.66  
 
Containment – unproblematised during the 1990s ‘repatriation decade,’ which viewed 
host countries as waiting rooms pending return to an often-romanticised ‘home’67 – contradicts 
rights-based protection, and I concur that ‘the right to life has been bought at the cost of almost 
every other right.’68 The salience accorded to non-refoulement and the trade-off this entails, 
seldom questioned, may not always be justified. Resource pressures often mean host 
populations cannot exercise socio-economic rights, and ‘priority’ rights for refugees are the 
only realistic deliverables. Thus, UNHCR accepts this diluted rights panorama well past initial 
62 Anuradha Kumar, Human Rights: Global Perspectives (Sarup & Sons 2002) 161. 
63 James Hathaway, cited in Deardoff (n 37) 18. 
64 Susan Harris Rimmer, ‘Reconceiving refugees and internally displaced persons as transitional justice actors’ 
(UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2010) <http://www.unhcr.org/4bbb2a589.pdf> accessed 
23 August 2013, 1. 
65 Verdirame (n 35). 
66 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford University Press 1998) 78.  
67 Guglielmo Verdirame and Barbara Harrell-Bond, Rights in Exile: Janus-faced Humanitarianism (Berghahn 
Books 2005) 335. 
68 Jeff Crisp, ‘No Solutions in Sight: The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa’ (2003) 22(4) 
Refugee Survey Quarterly 114, 125. 
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emergency phases, in which there exists temporary logistical justification for derogations, and 
for hosting refugees in camps, limited to the immediate purpose of security and identity checks 
by the Refugee Convention’s Article 31(2).69 UNHCR posits ‘effective protection’ as an 
acceptable bundle of minimum entitlements: lesser but permissible protection which covers 
merely ‘core’ rights to non-refoulement, life, subsistence, family unity and gender and age-
specific rights,70 or is itself a barrier to fully accessing rights. Though UNHCR and state 
obligations differ, the Agency’s threshold is arbitrary and unregulated. Nonetheless, its 
supervision of the sanctity of non-refoulement in the Bangladeshi context is a necessity, but 
not one that should come at the expense of core socio-economic rights, however tied its hands 
may be. Genuine self-sufficiency drives, predicated on increased freedoms, would in fact free 
up resources – an argument against flood-gate fears – in the face of the intractability of this 
protracted refugee situation. 
 
Service cuts 
 
Voluntariness of returns under coercive conditions is questionable, especially given 
negligible prospects for resettlement or local integration, though UNHCR commonly employs 
the ‘cuts’ strategy, to induce relocation and following funding shortfalls. In 2003 this occurred 
in Bangladesh, though UNHCR insisted that improvements in Rakhine State were substantial 
and refugees were not pressurised to return. Although accompanied by proposals for self-
sufficiency programmes for stayees (language that puts a positive spin on transfer of 
responsibility), conflating operational constraints and distinct security and protection matters 
is disingenuous. That Bangladeshi officials allegedly perpetrated the more directly coercive 
acts, such as threats of detention, withholding aid, and beatings,71 is unlikely to absolve 
UNHCR of responsibility in refugees’ eyes, for both parties’ actions generate a cumulative 
experience of harassment and pressure eventually culminating in a ‘decision’ to leave. In 2011 
cuts in nutrition services and gender-based violence assistance exacerbated poverty and 
tensions in the camps, causing increased violence against women.72 The gravity of these not-
unpredictable results may focus a spotlight on the complicity-culpability debate, however it is 
not conclusive. The most persuasive argument implicating UNHCR in forced return may be 
the direct causality asserted by a Bangladeshi official: ‘UNHCR’s decision to withdraw from 
the camps… caused us to try to speed up repatriations.’73 
 
UNHCR’s continuation of this strategy, fully aware of its implications, typifies 
international insistence on subjugating refugees’ fears and perceptions. Privileging ‘objective’ 
institutional ‘knowledge’ of situations reduces individuals to units requiring logistical 
management, impeding conception of them as rights-bearers. Reflecting the balancing of 
tensions between the objective and subjective elements central to refugee law (the ‘well-
founded fear’), this top-down, knowing-what’s-best inhibits agency outright, curtailing what 
autonomy refugees retain in a camp environment, and further alienating Rohingyas from their 
rights. When trust in UNHCR is rock-bottom, given coerced repatriations and previous aborted 
‘pull-out’ attempts, as well as resentment for the increasingly critical aid levels for the refugee 
69 Deardoff (n 37). 
70 Dallal Stevens, ‘What do we mean by protection?’ (2013) 20(1) International Journal on Minority and Group 
Rights, Special Issue: Critical Issues in Refugee Law 233. 
71 Refugees International, ‘Lack of Protection Plagues Burma Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh,’ Op-Ed (Asian 
Tribune, 2003) <http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2003/05/31/lack-protection-plagues-burma-rohingya-
refugees-bangladesh> accessed 22 August 2013. 
72 Refugees International (n 33) 2. 
73 Refugees International (n 71). 
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population, individuals may not come forward with their fears of return (anticipating being 
ignored, or retaliation for denouncing mistreatment to ‘outsiders’), skewing UNHCR’s 
understanding of the population. The 1994 repatriations revolved around scant access to 
information for the encamped Rohingya who, with the shift from individual interviews to mass 
registration and information sessions, felt ‘confused and pressurised to leave.’74 The resultant 
systematic refoulement means that UNHCR is now unlikely to be seen as a promoter of greater 
access to information, facilitating access to rights and justice, but rather complicit in duping 
refugees. 
 
Information and return 
 
The politics of knowing acquire new dimensions when applied to the access Rohingya 
refugees have to information about conditions in Myanmar, and the consequences of this on 
decisions to return. To access one’s rights requires not just to be informed, but also to be in a 
position to judge those factors affecting any rights trade-offs one might have to make. A 
multiplicity of sources is essential for meaningful access to information: it is unsurprising that 
refugees do not rely on UNHCR-distributed information, however objective this may be. 
Restrictions on NGOs in Bangladeshi camps hamper information flows, though institutional 
diversity may not equal reliability, if one views often-subcontracted NGOs, financially-
dependent on UNHCR as ‘part and parcel of the power structure of refugee camps,’ and prone 
to avoiding dissent.75 Clarity is lacking on the aims and eventual outcomes of the GoM’s 
divisive draft ‘Rakhine Action Plan,’ through which citizenship can theoretically be confirmed, 
but which in practice is more likely to perpetuate mis-labelling of Rohingya as ‘Bengali,’ and 
entrench segregation, and even detention of Rohingya. Given the centrality of citizenship to 
the Rohingyas’ persecution, return cannot be expected without the relevant information, 
regardless of the security situation. UNHCR’s record at facilitating access to information is 
poor: the 1990s saw manipulation of evidence and omissions of fact, wilful and unwitting, by 
UNHCR. The ‘credibility’ lens, permanently focussed on asylum seekers, can be reversed to 
highlight the incoherence of institutional behaviour in the eyes of those who will factor in such 
inconsistencies when assessing whether to return. This disrupts the propensity to construct 
refugees as ‘rational actors when they decide to return but moved by extraneous motives if they 
decide to stay.’76 Deconstructing such representations helps comprehend how refugees are 
disenfranchised within the very systems intended to protect their rights: accessing citizenship 
is, again, but one front for struggle.  
 
Assessment of the situation in Myanmar was inhibited in the 1990s by UNHCR’s lack 
of ground presence and the dearth of civilian monitors, and accusations of dishonesty abound: 
UNHCR told returnees ‘further border crossing would result in arrests for illegal departure,’77 
and Agency staff allegedly justified repatriation as ‘the forced labour about which the 
Rohingyas complain does not constitute persecution because all Burmese are required to 
perform it.’78 MSF documented this distorted argument – blind to the citizenship question, and 
also found that 65% of refugees did not know they could refuse repatriation, despite only 9% 
74 Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), Repatriation of Burmese Refugees from Thailand and 
Bangladesh: A Briefing Paper – Research and Information Series No. 8 (ACFOA Burma Human Rights Project 
1996) 9. 
75 Verdirame (n 35) 272. 
76 B. S. Chimni, ‘From Resettlement to Involuntary Repatriation: Towards a Critical History of Durable 
Solutions to Refugee Problems’ (2004) 23(3) Refugee Survey Quarterly 55, 62. 
77 Staples (n 25) 144. 
78 United States Committee for Refugees  (n 26) 7. 
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wanting to return, demonstrating that ‘the refugees [did] not have the necessary information 
available to take a well-considered decision to repatriate.’79 Obtaining information is thus 
crucial for resisting refoulement, and is as important as access to citizenship in enabling 
Rohingya to exercise their rights.  
 
UNHCR’s dubious credibility record implies overstretched offices pressured to 
effectuate returns, lacking both critically-reflective practitioners, and the time and space within 
which to assess the ethics of the policy for implementation. The contradictions in UNHCR’s 
claim that ‘they had a moral obligation to ensure that repatriation did as little harm as possible, 
even if doing so meant involving itself in forced repatriation’80 are evident, however there is 
no moral high ground between involvement to minimise immediate suffering, and effectively 
legitimising oppressive acts. However, Verdirame and Harrell-Bond’s view of the utter 
reprehensibility of UN humanitarianism is exaggerated, as violations and oversights must also 
be attributed to testing environments and sovereign states’ inflexibility: ultimately states dictate 
the restrictive circumstances in which abuses arise. Blaming a system, not individuals, is 
inescapable: humanitarian systems are shaped by so many individuals that it is generally 
impossible to pin responsibility to one body or actor. Diffuse action defies accountability and 
permits internal division, perpetuating dysfunctionality and apparent contradictions. The 
dispossessed, disenfranchised and displaced Rohingya are left decrying a total lack of access 
to justice – international humanitarian space empties into a liability void, with no route to a 
remedy. Despite the gravity of the non-refoulement principle, attaching responsibility to 
UNHCR if it erroneously declares a country safe and facilitates the return of subsequently 
persecuted individuals remains questionable. If conditions within a UNHCR-run camp are 
essentially inhuman, but this stems from constraints imposed by the host government, it is 
problematic to pin full blame on either entity. Once shades of complicity are acknowledged, 
allocating responsibility becomes even more tenuous. Furthermore, once the international 
community accepts responsibility in a protracted encampment situation, the duties of host states 
become obscured. 
 
 
 
International rejection 
 
The notable lack of signatories to the Refugee Convention in Southeast Asia may not 
signal the low priority of forced migration, but rather a resistance to being compelled to address 
issues through outdated Eurocentric frameworks. States in the region reflect the current global 
reticence towards accepting refugees, and consequently it is unlikely that such issues will be 
taken up diplomatically under any remit other than security. Esther Kiragu et al. suggest 
leveraging the Bali Process, an Asia-Pacific anti-trafficking initiative, in the search for 
solutions.81 It should be noted that international frameworks on trafficking are not human rights 
instruments, but instead form protocols to the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. 
Deferring refugee protection to a criminal law-enforcement paradigm is risky, however the 
present impasse makes attempting to engage under this umbrella worthwhile – indeed the 
Process is asylum-sensitive. There is some hope that regional leadership in addressing the 
exploitation of migrant workers (many are sender states) could catalyse a focus on the 
Rohingya issue, for many Rohingya abroad traverse categories, unable to return for fear of 
79 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), ‘MSF’s concerns on the repatriation of Rohingya refugees from 
Bangladesh to Burma,” Open Letter, 1 May 1995, Amsterdam/Paris (MSF 1995a) 4. 
80 M. Barnett, cited in Pittaway (n 40) 97. 
81 Kiragu et al. (n 3) 25. 
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persecution, and working as migrant labourers across Asia and the Middle East, though 
concrete initiatives are lacking at present. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has offered (in vain) to mediate between Buddhist and Muslim communities, though 
the bloc generally refrains from speaking out, given its premium on non-intervention, and 
members’ desire to maintain smooth trade relations with resource-rich Myanmar and avoid 
secondary movement of Rohingya to their territories. Foregrounding the regional nature of 
Rohingya displacement is needed, as even India and China are affected, though counting on 
their influence does not yet look promising: there is little high-level traction behind Rohingya 
rights campaigns. An Asian alternative to Eurocentric refugee protection frameworks seems 
far-fetched at the time of writing, though it may be an angle to encourage, particularly through 
the ASEAN system, in order to push back at the overall international hesitance to accept 
refugees in recent decades. 
 
International failures could also be alleged according to the Refugee Convention’s 
burden-sharing provisions, considering that most major resettlement states (Australia, Canada, 
the Nordic countries) are full signatories. However, international cooperation on refugee issues 
is overshadowed by aid donations and arms-length policies. Resettlement remains an 
underused protection tool, particularly since destination-countries’ heightened post-9/11 
security screenings, and a climate of global Islamophobia. This has prejudiced Rohingyas’ 
chances of resettlement, though they were never perceived as an ideal resettlement population 
prior to this, given their polygamy, damaged health, low education and skills levels and high 
rates of conflict and sexual abuse – due to decades-long isolation, persecution and tensions 
induced by encampment conditions.82  When selecting Burmese refugees, states displayed a 
preference for Christian Karen and Karenni refugees.83  States’ ability to ‘shop’ for ideal, 
‘integratable’ groups highlights the dominance of purportedly objective international 
knowledge, at the expense of a contextualised, non-essentialising explanation of group 
dynamics. Whilst resettlement states’ protection capacities must be considered (indeed 
Rohingyas are a highly traumatised group who would require intensive support), vulnerable 
Southeast Asian populations have integrated successfully into various contexts in the past: the 
driving principle of resettlement has ceased to be refugee needs and rights, but rather the 
priorities of ‘northern’ states. Australia’s resettlement policies epitomise the cynical use of this 
pathway: resettlement is deployed to detract attention from increasingly draconian approaches 
to ‘managing’ refugees arriving by boat. 
 
The Rohingyas’ systematic disenfranchisement and isolation outstrips that of Burmese 
refugees encamped long-term in Thailand, resulting in differential recognition of these 
populations. The Thai context is more enabling, resulting in highly organised political, 
charitable, educational and religious entities amongst Karen, Shan and Kachin refugees. 
Conversely, Bangladesh’s stranglehold on the Rohingya impedes their ability to advocate for 
themselves internationally: pressure groups in exile are smaller and less networked than other 
Burmese groups (due also to their rejection by the opposition), contributing to their external 
invisibility, and exacerbating disproportionately low resettlement rates historically. Although 
resettlement from Bangladesh was suspended in 2010, and has been stopped from Thailand to 
the US, Burmese have traditionally featured high in resettlement statistics, becoming the largest 
82 UNHCR, ‘Bangladesh: Analysis of Gaps in the Protection of Rohingya Refugees’ (UNHCR, 2007) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=46fa1af32&query=Bangladesh%20Rohingya> accessed 24 
August 2013; Kiragu et al., (n 3) 9. 
83 Pittaway (n 40) 97. 
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group of refugees submitted globally for resettlement by UNHCR in 2011.84 Conversely, 
between 2006 and 2010 only 1744 Burmese (preponderantly Rohingya) were submitted for 
resettlement from Bangladesh and only 926 ultimately departed.85 
 
Bangladesh’s resettlement freeze aims to eliminate ‘pull-factors’ supposedly prompting 
or sustaining an influx of refugees.  Alongside local integration, some states perceive 
resettlement to equate to condoning persecution: if a country is intent on driving a population 
out, supplying an expedited exit could be deemed to be aiding policies of ethnic cleansing. 
Similarly, states may refuse to resettle stateless groups, seeking to avoid policies perceived to 
legitimise denationalisation. This would contravene UNHCR’s guidelines, which ‘promote 
resettlement as a solution for stateless persons in precarious situations without the prospect of 
a solution… even if [they] …do not also qualify as refugees under the… Convention.’86 
Bangladesh’s foreclosing of this avenue underscores the difficulties UNHCR faces when 
working in a restrictive protection environment ultimately orchestrated within states’ own 
parameters. Established pathways to full enjoyment of rights remain inaccessible to Rohingya, 
and international protection – much like the national citizenship landscape – remains a site in 
which barriers proliferate. 
 
 
3. Solutions 
 
Rethinking displacement 
 
With none of the traditional durable solutions a prospect, and the more progressive 
‘transnationalism’ – allowing refugees to restore the broken bond with their state by acquiring 
passports, but not requiring their physical return, facilitating cross-border livelihoods and 
respecting internationalised identities87 – an even fainter possibility, re-moulding old concepts 
may help un-stick the existing stalemate. Humanitarian discourse can coagulate around 
uncritical buzzwords, stagnating thinking and camouflaging meanings, both productive and 
obstructive. Describing the scope of one’s activities and discussions as ‘space’ – prefixed by 
‘humanitarian’ or ‘protection’ – renders processes and dynamics something static. This deflects 
focus from action and progress, constructing provocative work and the intangible concepts that 
inform it, such as human rights, as something fixed and knowable. Such anodyne epithets do 
not ultimately advance the interests of humanitarian actors working with repressive 
governments: evading direct conceptual engagement on a linguistic level predisposes 
discussions to circumlocution and deadlock. 
 
This ‘spatialised’ mode of understanding magnifies notions of place, encouraging 
thinking in terms of territoriality and borders. This legitimises authorities’ fixation with ‘who 
is where’ and movement, fostering a view of forced migrants as disruptive and in need of 
management. This must be replaced with conceptions of refugee, internally displaced and in-
placed Rohingya as individuals possessing and exercising rights and duties. Developments 
84 UNHCR, ‘Resettlement: A New Beginning in a Third Country’ (UNHCR, 2012) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1676.html> accessed 24 August 2013. 
85 UNHCR, ‘Bangladesh Fact Sheet March 2013’ (UNHCR, 2013a) <http://www.unhcr.org/50001ae09.html> 
accessed 15 August 2013, 2. 
86 UNHCR, ‘Self-Study Module on Statelessness’ (UNHCR Global Learning Centre, 2012a) 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/50b899602.html> accessed 24 August 2013, 101. 
87 Katy Long, ‘Home alone? A review of the relationship between repatriation, mobility and durable solutions 
for refugees’ (UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation Service, 2010) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/4b97afc49.html> accessed 25 August 2013. 
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such as the articulation of the right not to be displaced, made explicit in Article 5(1) of the UN 
Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, and the 
resultant emphasis on individual choice (to move or not to move), seek to bolster this outlook.88 
A focus on physical containment and pinning people down must be further shifted to political, 
legal and human intangibles. The legal discourse of forced migration is also highly 
geographical: refugee law hinges on border-crossing; accessing citizenship on proving where 
one ‘belongs’ (increasingly problematic in this globalised age), and citizenship laws on 
domicile and birthplace. We speak of law’s borders, and ‘spaces of exception’ and 
rightlessness,89 glossing over the processes of disenfranchisement and dehumanisation carried 
out on legislative and inter-personal levels that create them. Recognising these ‘spaces’ as 
constructed, not natural, signals their potential for deconstruction, encouraging us to discard 
the population-control ‘mapping mentality’ and view socio-economic and legal barriers that 
affect rights as reversible discrimination, rather than just a feature of the landscape.  
 
The combative connotations of much international-organisation-speak is a compelling 
reason to shed over-spatialisation of the Rohingya rights debate: ubiquitous talk of ‘Operational 
Objectives: Increase humanitarian space’90 and ‘persistence in pushing the boundaries in 
Burma [to]… effectively expand humanitarian space’91 can only appear interventionist to the 
GoM. Moving away from territorial thinking and the practice of mapping mandates onto 
contested land in fragile states is no cure-all, but it represents a start: language frames attitude. 
If protection activities and principles become ‘protection space’ and are conflated with 
‘humanitarian space,’ the professionalised, privatised domain of international actors, jumpy 
transitional governments will view them warily. ‘Humanitarian’ is routinely invoked to 
whitewash intentions: Maung Zarni highlights the perversion of ‘humanitarian space’ in 
Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis, accusing the aid industry of manipulating this as an 
opportunity for self-exposure and spreading their influence.92 This obstructs collaborative 
roads to change, entrenching the confrontational dichotomy of foreign human rights actors 
dictating to local elites that is so easily elided with Western intervention paradigms and thus 
side-lined. International human rights law may be interventionist in intent, as opposed to the 
‘“remedial” or palliative’ function of traditional refugee law’ in emergencies,93 necessitating 
sensitive approaches. Great difficulties exist in speaking to power in anything other than the 
terms of state interests, though nascent transitions are an opportunity for governments to signal 
a break with past authoritarianism: now, if any, is the time to push hard to refresh official 
discourse in Myanmar. 
 
88 Michèle Morel, Maria Stavropoulou and Jean-François Durieux ‘The history and status of the right not to be 
displaced’ (Forced Migration Review, 2012) <http://www.fmreview.org/preventing/morel-et-al#_edn3> 
accessed 22 March 2015. 
89 Agamben (n 66). 
90 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Myanmar March – April 2013’ (UNHCR, 2013b) 
<http://www.unhcr.org.hk/files/2013%20Emergency/Myanmar/MYA%20Fact%20Sheet%20April%20March%
202013.pdf> accessed 25 August 2013, 1. 
91 Refugees International (RI), ‘Burma: An Opportunity to Expand Humanitarian Space,’ Field Report (RI, 
2012) 
<http://refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/011112_Burma_An_Opportunity%20with%20letterhead.pdf
> accessed 25 August 2013, 2. 
92 Maung Zarni, ‘Orientalisation and Manufacturing of “Civil Society” in Contemporary Burma,’ in Zawawi 
Ibrahim (ed.) Social Science and Knowledge in a Globalising World (Malaysian Social Science Association and 
Petaling Jaya Strategic Information and Research Development Centre 2012) 287 – 310, 301. 
93 James Hathaway, cited in Ralph Wilde, ‘Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: Why and How UNHCR 
Governance of “Development” Refugee Camps Should be Subject to International Human Rights Law’ (1998) 
1998(1) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 107, 123. 
22 
 
                                                          
Neither do I find ‘humanitarian space’ a useful concept in the Bangladeshi context. 
Situations of protracted displacement constrain humanitarian principles of impartiality and 
even humanity,94 as illustrated by the unclear duties and compromised protection administered 
in the camps. The proclamation of increased humanitarian space in Rakhine State when 
UNHCR was granted presence in 1994 directly encouraged the continuation of the 
controversial returns programme: this ‘expanded humanitarian space’ engendered reasoning 
that ‘Rohingyas were better off in their homes in Myanmar where the UNHCR… had a 
presence.’95 The term masks questionable practices, and illustrates how anyone can ascribe 
meaning to ‘space.’ Local commentators have scorned international interpretations of the 
recent violence as owing to the (little-questioned) transition opening up long-suppressed space 
to organise,96 for this ‘empirically inaccurate… “democratization-contributes-to-the-rise-of-
violent-conflicts” framework’97 explains away state involvement in fostering unrest to create 
scapegoats for economic problems, construct a threat and justify the military’s continued 
prominence. 
 
The meaning of space is highly contextualised and therefore problematic when accepted 
as immutable, a flaw central to Myanmar’s conflicts: colonial Burma’s artificially delineated 
territories and their structuring through the census and the map ‘created new ways of 
understanding space and power’98 and inflated the significance of borders. As 
‘transnationalism’ demonstrates, creatively thinking around the statist borders paradigm and 
celebrating or de-problematising mobility is most crucial and productive when faced with the 
inadequacies of the well-worn durable solutions to refugee situations. This moves the debate 
outside international law’s paralysing construction of migrants, citizens and refugees as 
comprehensible only in relation to the ‘bounded spaces’99 that categorise and imbue them with 
meaning. I concur that the figure of the refugee intrinsically ‘unhinges the old trinity of 
state/nation/territory,’100 indicating a wealth of potential for transcending blinkered, spatialised 
understandings and chipping away at conceptual barriers to accessing both citizenship and 
human rights in general.  
 
Human rights vs. human relations in Myanmar 
 
Alison Kesby invokes the polysemy of ‘space’ to posit a less restrictive characterisation 
of forced migrants: she eschews predominant vertical concepts of bestowal of immigration or 
citizenship status in favour of portraying the notion of having a ‘place in the world’ as a 
horizontal, networked practice through ‘recognition as a rights-holder… conferred upon 
oneself through a politics of human rights’ that rests on community interaction and inclusion.101 
Progress is implausible without these relational practices: durable prospects for the Rohingya 
are unlikely to be furthered through the human rights rhetoric now so mistrusted by their Bamar 
94 Michael G. Smith, ‘Better Approaches to Protracted Displacement?’ in Howard Adelman (ed.) Protracted 
Displacement in Asia: No Place to Call Home (Ashgate 2008) 209 – 236. 
95 Sumbul Rizvi, ‘Managing Refugees: The Role of the UNHCR in South Asia,’ in P. R. Chari, Mallika Joseph 
and Suba Chandran (eds.) Missing Boundaries: Refugees, Migrants, Stateless and Internally Displaced Persons 
in South Asia (Manohar 2003) 193 – 211, 202. 
96 International Crisis Group (n 10). 
97 Zarni (n 8). 
98 Lisa B. Brooten, ‘Global Communications, Local Conceptions: Human Rights and the Politics of 
Communication Among the Burmese Opposition in Exile,’ DPhil Dissertation (Ohio University, 2003) 
<http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Lisa_Brooten_dissertation-ocr.pdf> accessed 25 August 2013, 9. 
99 Kesby (n 21) 15. 
100 Agamben (n 13) 117. 
101 Kesby (n 21) 7. 
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and Rakhine persecutors. The need for community reconciliation is overwhelming: despite 
windows of potential, obstacles are numerous. The legal landscape remains repressive, with 
discriminatory bills restricting religious freedom presently under discussion in early 2015, in 
contravention of international instruments, indicating that top-down change in attitudes 
remains distant.102 Human rights language retains some usefulness, though its limitations lead 
me to advocate a mixed approach, with both inter-personal and legal fronts. 
 
These are interdependent: justice and ‘mutually respectful dialogue cannot occur while 
discrimination… remains unaddressed,’103 and in turn, accountability for violations through 
legal processes is crucial for restoring trust among Rohingya. For Myanmar to recast itself as 
tolerant country whose strength is diversity, all parties must accept the present moment as a 
genuine transition, and a phase of opening up, modernisation, and breaking with the past. Fear 
of the Other has been exacerbated by years of isolation and propaganda – it is unsurprising, but 
not a given. The present dichotomy of ‘pro-Rohingya or pro-Rakhine, with nothing in 
between’104 leaves gaping space between these two poles, to be inscribed with alternatives of 
cohesion and respect. It is not just ‘citizenship [that] is perhaps the only institution that has the 
capacity to turn strangers into fellows and residents into associates,’105 but communities. That 
decades of military dictatorship have undermined the social contract assumed to underpin the 
state-citizen bond reveals the fragility of both citizenship and communities – and their 
consequent malleability. 
 
However, the agency required for rapprochement between communities to occur is 
problematic. Staples pessimistically posits that ‘an ethnic group whose members are now the 
victims of cruelty cannot use their existing cultural identity and language to somehow 
“persuade” their oppressors that they are worthy of respect and protection, for it is that very 
identity and language which is often the cause of their dehumanisation and oppression.’106 The 
practical barriers for Rohingya, segregated and confined, to conduct mentality-altering 
outreach are daunting. Acts of solidarity must be initiated by other groups, or facilitated by the 
government. The potential for change is therefore effectively dependent on the charitable 
empathy of the privileged, compacting Rohingyas’ disenfranchisement, and eliminating them 
from their own emancipatory struggle. Empathy is distant: widespread conviction endures that 
Rohingyas receive disproportionate international assistance and local war-affected Rakhine 
suffer more and invisibly.107 This underlines the interconnectedness of global and local 
searches for solutions and their inevitable tensions.   
 
Some interfaith peace initiatives and small-scale inter-community trade persist, but 
these are the exception. Past semblances of inclusion have had ulterior motives: voting rights 
in the 2008 constitutional referendum were extended to Rohingya who agreed not to leave 
102 Radio Free Asia, ‘Civil Society Groups Urge Myanmar to Drop Bills to “Protect” Religion, Race’ (Radio 
Free Asia, 2015) <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/bills-01292015150834.html> accessed 23 March 
2015. 
103 UNHCR, ‘2013 UNHCR regional operations profile - South-East Asia’ (UNHCR, 2013) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487c66.html> accessed 20 August 2013, para 56. 
104 IRIN, ‘Prospects for Rakhine reconciliation dim’ (IRIN, 2013a) 
<http://www.irinnews.org/report/97956/prospects-for-rakhine-reconciliation-dim> accessed 27 August 2013. 
105 Kostakopoulou (n 51) 4. 
106 Staples (n 25) 59. 
107 Refugees International (RI), ‘Rohingya in Burma: Spotlight on Current Crisis Offers Opportunity for 
Progress’ (RI, 2012b) 
<http://www.refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/103012_Rohingya_In_Burma%20letterhead.pdf> 
accessed 27 August 2013, 2. 
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Myanmar, acting as a barrier to flight in the event of persecution.108 In places, low-level 
Rohingya returns are underway,109 indicating that community-level planning is paramount, and 
sites for potential rapprochement exist. Grassroots efforts could be the only solutions not 
viewed as implanted. My own suggestions are inescapably an outsider’s, though I am more 
optimistic regarding those initiatives which endeavour to underscore shared experiences of 
oppression by the military that both Rakhine and Rohingya groups have suffered, in an attempt 
to foment solidarity and understanding.  
 
Reconceptualising ethnicity in Burmese discourse is another complex but necessary 
task, and could be a starting point for community-level critical interrogation of the Rohingya 
issue, with a view to displacing the resurgence of nationalist pride in Myanmar with pride in 
diversity. Education is key here: myths of a once-homogenous Myanmar could be addressed 
through a reformed curriculum, though engendering perceptible attitude shifts takes time. It is 
short-term thinking that permits exclusion, with Rakhine perceiving benefits from the 
Rohingyas’ reduced freedoms. Long-term, the interdependence and tensions that ensue from 
such marginalisation can result in a spiral of decline: Rohingya areas are underdeveloped and 
neglected in healthcare and education, disadvantaging local Rakhine populations too, setting 
the scene for instability.110  
 
Couching rapprochement in human rights language remains a markedly international 
tendency, with potential and drawbacks. What with the fragility of the human rights concept 
itself – perennially undone by positivist/naturalist and universal/relative debates, and the failure 
of this purported protection in the paradigmatic WWII production of statelessness – this may 
not be the most useful vocabulary for engendering change in Myanmar. The individualistic 
nature of human rights as espoused in the ‘West’ does not communicate the issues of 
community spirit and group membership at stake here. Rights-speak may be leveraged to instil 
recognition and support fundraising, however a solution is obscured by the tension between 
this communicative power and human rights’ negative connotations amongst those with whom 
dialogue is sought. Domestic and foreign manipulation of the term illustrates its polysemy. 
GoM reasoning that the Rohingya two-child policy will advance women’s rights, by reducing 
their poverty,111 mirrors another earlier distortion of rights-based thinking – invoking 
Rohingyas’ purported right to return to Myanmar in the 1990s was a tactic to advance an 
ASEAN membership bid.112 The 2011 establishment of the Burmese National Human Rights 
Commission is regarded as a superficial attempt to encourage donors and investors of the new 
government’s reliability, rather than a serious channel for the demands against power that 
rights-speak has come to frame. Rohingyas’ exclusion from opposition alliances highlights 
how rights-speak has displaced substantive rights – internalisation of such concepts appears 
lacking. 
 
Meanwhile, the externalisation of Myanmar’s issues generates concern – international 
human rights actors display inconsistencies, underscored by their perceived partiality towards 
Rohingya, fostering the view that rights are not universal. A striking incoherence is that the 
language of refugees’ ‘right to return’ is widely invoked to rush repatriation and keep forced 
migrants in the global south. The Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees convolutedly 
108 Staples (n 25) 149. 
109 Refugees International (n 39) 4. 
110 UNHCR (n 86) 35. 
111 Aruna Kashyap, ‘Burma’s Bluff on the Two-Child Policy for Rohingyas’ (The Irrawaddy, 2013) 
<http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/38086> accessed 2 September 2013. 
112 Staples (n 25) 153.  
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constructs refugees’ right to a solution under international human rights law, from UDHR’s 
right to a nationality (relying on the instrument’s acceptance as custom, which is not universal): 
if membership in a national community is a prerequisite for effective protection, and since 
refugees lack membership, states’ binding commitment to human rights norms must necessitate 
provision of membership.113 He marries the Refugee Convention’s Article 35 (state duty to 
cooperate with UNHCR) with the UNHCR Statute’s first Article (‘seeking permanent solutions 
for the problems of refugees’), teasing out a state duty to assist in solving protracted 
displacement. Such inferred rights and duties are an exercise in academic legalism and serve 
merely to highlight the irrelevance of rights-speak to many individuals’ daily realities, as well 
as the divergence between human rights provisions and their use in practice. 
 
Rights-talk can further alienate given perceptions that it is ‘the newest “civilizing” 
influence in contemporary neocolonialist maneuvres [sic],’114 which stratifies suffering natives 
and rights-literate internationals, however necessary international supervision of protection 
may be. The prevalence of ‘victim’ when speaking of rights violations renders Rohingya 
survivors of persecution passive, inhibiting acknowledgment of their strength, dignity and 
agency beyond this legalistic framework. Perpetuating the ‘deficiency model of the natives,’ 
Zarni argues, international actors may have good intentions, but it is precisely the ‘morally 
seductive nature of these new multifaceted “civilising mission(s)” …which conceal undeclared 
foreign commercial strategic interests being pursued alongside the rhetoric of human rights and 
democratisation.’115 Much like the Burmese opposition, international actors appear to validate 
‘forms of democracy, as opposed to its essence’116 when ending sanctions and strengthening 
diplomatic and trade relations without foregrounding Rohingyas’ continued abuse. 
 
If human rights edify community unification discourses, their differential significance 
for ethnic groups must be acknowledged. The Bamar majority are primarily depicted as 
suffering civil and political rights violations, whilst non-Bamar are associated with socio-
economic and cultural abuses. That this alignment with ‘second tier’ rights cements ‘second 
tier’ status for minorities, as Lisa Brooten proposes, is persuasive. ‘Western’ views of human 
rights are first-generation-centric, with much attention focussed on Myanmar’s democracy 
process, with political rights as a prerequisite. However, when immediate needs are unmet, the 
significance of civil and political rights is questionable. A rights-centric approach should 
reassess those issues commonly categorised as ‘development’ problems, and focus advocacy 
on historical underdevelopment, poverty, resource exportation and land issues in Rakhine 
State, to mitigate both Rakhine and Rohingya grievances. This goes hand in hand with 
reconciliatory efforts, for investment in the region is unlikely while unrest (and mass 
statelessness) persists, yet at the same time economic disparities do not facilitate 
rapprochement. Similarly, minority language bans are viewed through a cultural rights prism, 
rather than seen as a political violation of the right to freedom of expression, as the detention 
of dissidents may be categorised, revealing how human-rights-talk sheds light on some 
injustices while concealing others, perpetuating marginalisation.117 Nonetheless, much like 
citizenship, economic development is no panacea: redistribution is paramount, and exclusion 
of ‘outsiders’ is a direct response to perceived resource inequalities – a major manifestation of 
113 T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Stephen Poellot, ‘The Responsibility to Solve,’ Working Paper Series #3, The 
Program on Law & Human Development (University of Notre Dame, 2012) <http://www3.nd.edu/~ndlaw/prog-
human-rights/working-papers/AleinikoffResponsibility.pdf> accessed 2 September 2013, 6. 
114 Brooten (n 98) 360. 
115 Zarni (n 92) 289. 
116 ibid 297. 
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anti-Rohingya prejudice is an economic boycott of Muslim businesses. Access to development 
is yet another vital component of access to justice. 
 
Moving forwards 
 
 Alongside economic issues, rule of law should remain amongst the GoM’s highest 
priorities. Holding more state and non-state actors to account for their role in the 2012 violence 
may not jump-start community-level reconciliation, but warns future extremists. Existing laws’ 
inadequacies should not be overlooked. Establishing rule of law extends beyond 
implementation to reform of unjust frameworks that facilitate denial of abuses: re-writing the 
impenetrable ‘magical legalism’ of yesteryear118 helps render (legal) justice more accessible. 
One barrier to citizenship restrictions could be resolved – dependent on political will and local 
sensitivities – following methodology used in eastern Myanmar, where citizenship cards are 
issued to undocumented people when two local figureheads vouch for a family.119 The GoM’s 
approval of two stateless Chinese and Hindu communities for naturalisation, identified 
alongside UNHCR,120 sets positive precedent. An unexplored site for action is the relatively 
strong women’s rights stance of government and opposition leaders: the particular risks of 
statelessness for women (seeking ‘protective’ marriage to access status, which may trap women 
in exploitative relationships) could be taken up alongside Aung San Suu Kyi’s women’s rights 
campaigns – backed by many Burmese proud of being at the regional vanguard in gender 
equality. 
 
The Inquiry Commission’s report epitomises this tension between momentum and 
impasse regarding rights-based and reconciliation-based approaches. Mutual understanding; 
local dispute resolution mechanisms; registration of undocumented children, and banning hate 
speech are promoted, however they are interspersed with regressive recommendations; a blind-
spot on impunity and reforming discriminatory laws, and use ‘Bengali’ for Rohingya. Proposed 
psychosocial support evades displacement’s root causes, whilst suggestions for civic education 
dwell less on peace and tolerance than on advancing Burmese language and eliminating solely 
Muslim extremism.121 That it addresses sensitive tensions between local and national-level 
government responsibilities is promising, and semi-progressive sentiment (not terminology) – 
‘Government entities should also acknowledge the basic human rights of undocumented and 
illegal immigrants’122 – appears complimented by some actions, such as disbanding the 
persecutory border force. However, recommending prolonged segregation completely 
contradicts all suggestions for change. It is this hardline approach that initial drafts of the more 
recent ‘Rakhine Action Plan’ continued to maintain.123 The range of attitudes underlines the 
need for locally-sensitive initiatives over sweeping fix-its, whether the latter are in the guise of 
human rights, reconciliation, or similar lofty ideals. 
 
118 Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering (Polity Press 2001) 108. 
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<http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/images/uploads/Recommendation(English_Version).pdf> accessed 24 
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Advocating for fresh policies towards Rohingya in Bangladesh is necessary, but only 
complementary to addressing the root of the issue in Myanmar. Registering, integrating and 
allowing access to basic services are critically lacking, preventing Rohingya from realising 
their rights in exile, though small windows of progressive potential exist. Article 31 of the 
Bangladeshi Constitution affirms that the inalienable right to enjoy the protection of law 
extends beyond citizens to ‘every other person for the time being within Bangladesh’ and in 
Article 25(1)(b) asserts that the state shall ‘support oppressed peoples throughout the world 
waging a just struggle against imperialism, colonialism or racialism [sic]’ – all of which should 
feature in advocacy with the GoB. Additionally, Bangladeshi-born children are entitled to 
citizenship, and mass naturalisation of another stateless population, the Bihari, in 2008 
establishes a precedent. Bangladesh has benefited from international protection for its migrants, 
given its many labourers abroad, and from the 2011 UNHCR-assisted evacuation of almost 
6000 Bangladeshis from Libya,124 supporting arguments for creating a protective migration 
status for Rohingya. 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Practical difficulties are ultimately underscored by contradictions inherent in the 
nation-state system and its citizenship-based protection regime, in which nationality 
(belonging) accords more rights than humanity (being). Whilst concepts of citizenship and 
nationality are far from immutable, having evolved over time and according to place, the 
current paradigm is such that ‘the costs of exclusion rise with the institutionalisation of 
inclusion.’125 The greater citizenship’s protections, the more disadvantaged those without 
access to it become. The Rohingya situation illustrates the crisis of international protection, 
revealing how dependent this is on sovereign will. Given the state-driven genesis of this ideal, 
I conclude that responsibility for the failures of international protection lie predominantly with 
the states that equip the guardians of the refugee regime, rather than with UNHCR. Although 
access to citizenship equates to the ‘right to have rights,’126 which engenders dependency on 
states, access to justice is a broader concept, entailing a holistic view of the range of 
individuals’ rights. Here, international organisations have a significant bearing – especially in 
safeguarding human rights in exile, away from a citizenship-conferring polity, making them at 
times the protector of Rohingya rights and at times a violator. Easily reduced to accepting just 
core rights, such organisations should continually review whether their actions perpetuate or 
alleviate situations of protracted displacement, and whether they do all that is possible to 
destroy more barriers to accessing rights than they create. Where durable solutions remain 
ephemeral, security – both human, and of migration status – come to constitute this non-
derogable ‘core’ of rights that UNHCR is obliged to pursue at the expense of a comprehensive, 
or maximal protection guarantee. 
 
This rights-based framework by which organisations are managed and judged is 
therefore one significant reason to encourage the parallel tracks of community relations and 
human rights advocacy: rights articulate demands from power be it governmental or otherwise. 
To conclude, whether re-articulations of the stalled Rohingya rights debate can result in a fresh 
humanitarian and protection approach by states and Agencies – and ultimately in concrete 
improvements for oppressed Rohingya – is uncertain. Uncertainty, emblematic of most 
124 Kiragu et al. (n 3) 25. 
125 Staples (n 25) 116. 
126 Arendt (n 17). 
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transitions from authoritarianism, holds relatively boundless potential. How boundaries are set 
through legal reforms ultimately rests with the GoM, though this is not the only actor with 
influence: INGOs, international Agencies and local communities shape Rohingyas’ daily 
interaction with hierarchies of power and across ethnic lines. They too impinge on access to 
justice, underscoring just how multifaceted rights protection is, and why accountability should 
be sought in all possible directions, despite the primacy of local (rather than international) 
engagement in addressing Rohingya realities. 
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